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Abstract 
Based on Linux startup actual conditions, critical files in the startup process are analyzed so as to ensure the 
rationality of the credibility measurement. In order to provide a method to build the trust chain and do trust 
measurement and transferring on the trusted computing platform, a TPM simulation platform which has partial 
specific security features was constructed on the CentOS Linux, and then designed and implemented the trusted 
startup process based on data integrity. At last, the time cost which caused by trusted startup process was analyzed 
and calculated. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University of 
Science and Technology 
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1. Introduction 
In the TCG (Trusted Computing Platform) standard practice specifications[1,2,3], three features and 
properties are included in the trusted terminal: (1)ensure the uniqueness of the user identity, integrity and 
privacy of user workspace; (2)ensure the integrity of hardware configuration environment, operation 
system kernel, services and applications; (3)ensure the privacy and integrity of the information storage, 
processing and transmission. Because operation system is the foundation of terminal system applications, 
while the startup process is the foundation of operation system, so we need to study the Linux startup 
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process and do analysis of critical files in the process, so as to enhance the rationality and effectiveness of 
credibility measurement. 
2. Linux startup process 
When computer is powered on, BIOS gets the system control right, then creates a basic I/O subsystem 
and initializes some mainboard. After that, BIOS will transfer the control right to the system mainboard’s 
BIOS, and BIOS will take back the control right and transfer it to operation system’s master boot 
record(MBR) while the mainboard finishes its self-check and initialization work[4]. 55AA is the end 
symbol of the hard disk MBR. If the symbol was not changed, it probably means that the MBR has not 
been infected by computer virus or modified unlawful, MBR will boot the system to jump to the activity 
record MBR to read and check CMOS information and then boot appointed operation system kernel 
compressed files. 
When the boot process finished, and the operation system kernel executed codes were filled into the 
memory and uncompressed step by step, Linux startup process is beginning and system process and 
terminal process will be created. 
Fig.1 The execution flow of process init 
When the kernel is uncompressed and system is going to call start_kernel() function, core programs 
begin to startup and the Linux kernel initialization process will be executed under protected model. 
start_kernel() will call rest_init() in the last, and kernel has been built up after start_kernel() was executed. 
rest_init() is located in the file init/mail.c, and it will call kernel_thread() in which 
arch/ia64/kernel/process.c so as to build up a kernel thread for the process. Then the kernel stack would 
be built up which could execute init(). After the system call returned, an estimate will be made on which 
based ESP and ESI register state so as to decide whether the father process or son process will be 
executed. If it is father process, process ZERO will be executed, otherwise init() will be executed.  
Function init() is executed code which is part of the kernel codes, and it will be run in kernel state. 
After it initializes the kernel, it will call function kernel_thread() to build up several system kernel threads 
which are used to manage memory. Then, init() will call execve() to load the executed process init() in 
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from file /etc/inittab and then make it be executed. At this time, process ONE which execute init() will be 
evolved to process init, that means init() generates process init. 
Based on each line in file /etc/inittab, process init will generate new processes so as to build up the 
system service programs and finish the initialization of new processes. The execution flow of process init 
is as fig.1:  
After process init ended the initialization of script file /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit, it will execute each files 
under catalog /etc/rc.d/rc5.d. When process init executed /etc/rc.d/rc5.d, all the system initialization work 
have been ended, and now the system could work properly. 
In order to allow users to use the computer, process init will generate a number of terminal getty 
processes repeatedly. And then “login:” will be displayed on the screen, allowing users to log in and use 
the computer. Process getty will monitor the corresponding terminal and wait for users’ login. execve will 
execute registration programs and do user authentication through system call. After successful registration, 
login program will use execve to execute registration shell so as to provide an interface to users. 
3. TPM Emulator analysis and platform building 
The TPM Emulator is a simulation software that have partial hardware TPM characteristics, and the 
package consists of three main components[5]: (1)an user-space daemon tpmd, which is used to 
implement TPM emulator interface interaction and monitor local socket; (2)TPM device driver (tddl), 
provide conventional connectivity and access to TPM hardware interface, tddl send data to tpmd or 
receive data from tpmd through local socket; (3)kernel module (tpmd_dev) uses the characteristics of 
device /dev/tpm to hide the differences of underlying TPM hardware, and realize the communication 
interface between tpmd and the TPM kernel. The structure of TPM Emulator package shows in Fig2. 
tpmd_dev 
tddl 
Crypto Module
TPM Emulator 
Engine 
tpm
d
Application 
Fig.2 Structure of TPM Emulator package 
From the point of function view, TPM Emulator Engine[6] can be divided into four physical entities, 
including parameter encoding and decoding entity, command execution engine, cipher engine and storage 
of key, data and session.  
Process to build up the TPM Emulator platform base on Linux operation system is as follows: 
(1)Considering the simulator software’s compatibility with the operating system kernel, choose 
CentOS Linux 5.2 which has 2.6.18 kernel version to be installed (install components and packages such 
as GCC and CMake, etc.). 
(2)We should install software package trousers so as to provide support for TSS software stack, and 
GNU MP library so as to provide support for high-precision calculations. 
(3)Compile and install TPM Emulator 0.7 package. 
After building up the TPM Emulator platform, then we can use the characteristics and services 
provided by the platform to do integrity measurement and verification. 
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4. Measurement and verification of startup time  
4.1. Measurement and verification of boot up time  
The process from system power on to OS kernel was loaded into memory is a sequence of single chain 
process. According to the definition of PCR registers in TCG specification and iterative measurement of 
thinking, here we do several independent measurement and verification process as follows. 
Integrity measurement and verification of BIOS kernel made by CRTM: 
_ 0( _ ) ;BIOS KernelT Hash BIOS Kernel PCR= ∧     (1) 
Integrity measurement and verification of BIOS configuration information: 
_
_ _ 1
( ( _ ) _ );
.
BIOS Config
BIOS Config BIOS Config
Hash Hash Hash BIOS Kernel BIOS Config
T Hash PCR
= ∧
= ∧   (2) 
Integrity measurement and verification of information in ROM BIOS: 
_ _
_ _ 2
(( ) _ );
.
ROM BIOS BIOS Config
ROM BIOS ROM BIOS
Hash Hash Hash ROM BIOS
T Hash PCR
= ∧
= ∧    (3) 
Integrity measurement and verification of ROM configuration information: 
_ _
_ _ 3
( _ );
.
ROM Config ROM BIOS
ROM Config ROM Config
Hash Hash Hash ROM Config
T Hash PCR
= ∧
= ∧    (4) 
Integrity measurement and verification of IPL codes: 
_ _
_ _ 4
( _ );
.
IPL CODE ROM Config
IPL CODE IPL CODE
Hash Hash Hash IPL CODE
T Hash PCR
= ∧
= ∧     (5) 
Integrity measurement and verification of IPL codes configuration: 
_ _ _
_ _ _ _ 5
( _ _ );
.
IPL CODE Config IPL CODE
IPL CODE Config IPL CODE Config
Hash Hash Hash IPL CODE Config
T Hash PCR
= ∧
= ∧   (6) 
Integrity measurement and verification of OS kernel: 
_ _ _
_ _ 6
( _ );
.
OS Kernel IPL CODE Config
OS Kernel OS Kernel
Hash Hash Hash OS Kernel
T Hash PCR
= ∧
= ∧    (7) 
Core information of configurations, programs and codes will be sent to function measure_execve() as 
the hash function parameters, and then the hash results will be stored in the hash_data arrays with which 
unsigned char data type. hash_data array is stored in the file TPMLOG of TPM. The read and write 
permissions of TPMLOG are decided by Linux root user, that means there are root users and its specific 
procedures could parse the file only, and other users don’t have any permissions. File TPMLOG has 
encrypted time stamp, which will be modified when it is boot up every time so as to ensure the freshness 
of the file.  
Finally, we can program codes in the end of function tpm_init(struct pci_dev *pci_dev, struct 
tpm_chip *chip) which located in the file tpm.c under the catalog TPM\tpm to read the basic integrity 
measurement values in corresponding registers, and then recompile the TPM Emulator, and read the basic 
integrity measurement values as follows: 
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PCR-00: a3 9e 3f fe e1 c7 82 98 cb 62 cc fb 55 cd b9 f7 01 51 e1 40 
PCR-01: 0e 3b f3 e2 8a 8c f7 25 f5 78 19 5a c5 53 06 82 df e6 bf b6 
PCR-02: f0 ca af 58 ca b4 d1 22 bc 3d a0 3c bb 2e 9c d2 1c 50 4d fc 
PCR-03: 6e 24 f5 e1 f7 d7 58 4b 4f ce 3c 0e 5a 86 a9 03 36 94 b0 b0 
PCR-04: 94 0e 26 77 ee f4 b1 9c 89 58 94 91 48 fa e4 b2 93 07 b4 94 
PCR-05: 47 01 b9 fa cc 4f 4c a2 bc 7c 58 a1 4f 84 13 46 3f 50 3f c7 
PCR-06: f1 58 56 e9 b0 9a 84 d1 12 ad ae 75 16 c4 53 34 7d b6 a8 dc 
If all of the files, programs and codes in the boot up process passed the integrity verification, system 
will start the process of kernel startup, initialize important data structure and detect system hardware 
devices, and then it will generate system process and terminal process. 
4.2. Measurement and verification of init process by kernel 
Linux kernel is loaded into memory and uncompressed, process ZERO finishes the initialization of 
kernel itself and then kernel thread ONE is created. Thread ONE executes function init(), the kernel 
thread ONE will be evolved to kernel process ONE. Function init() still holds the system controlling right. 
Process init is created by the function init(), and /etc/inittab is the most important file in this process, 
so here we measure and verify the process init through measuring /etc/inittab, /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit and 
/etc/rc.d/rc.  
Firstly, select the modified time (CT) and read and write(RW) attributes of /etc/inittab to make an 
integrity measurement, which hash values r0:Hash(CT|RW). Secondly, make an integrity measurement 
for /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit, which hash values r1：Hash(rc.sysinit). Then, make an integrity measurement for 
/etc/rc.d/rc and which hash values r2：Hash(init.d). Finally, combine the above three hash values with the 
operator “|”, and its result will be considered as the whole integrity measurement of the init process. And 
then the value will be used to do a “^” operation with responding value in TPM register, which value will 
be analyzed for integrity verification. 
_ 8( 0 | 1| 2)init processT Hash r r r PCR= ∧     (8) 
Basic integrity value of init process measured by kernel is as follows: 
PCR-08: cf 62 6a 91 a4 e8 dc 64 06 07 8b 57 bb d4 da c1 f3 42 5b 92 
In this time, if files associated with process init had been modified, which means its integrity attribute 
was destroyed. And the value will be not consistent with the basic value when we calculate the integrity 
value using the same process and methods. So the process init will not be trusted. 
Here we do an experiment. Firstly, file /etc/inittab, /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit and /etc/rc.d/rc should be backed 
up, and then we modify the content of related files, recompiling TPM Emulator and extending the value 
of pcr8, lastly call the system codes we programmed before to read the value of pcr8 as follows: 
PCR-08: 8f d8 98 75 3a aa 0f 74 76 9f d0 81 ee 1e 2f cd 3d a4 9f 04 
It means that if any related file was modified, the integrity measurement value of the file will be not 
consistent with the basic value, and then the integrity verification process will not be passed and system 
controlling right will not be transferred to process init. Thus, here we provide a proof for illegal 
modification of system resources. 
If the integrity verification passed, it means the process init could be trusted in the system startup 
process, then the system controlling right could be transferred to process init and begin the process of 
terminal registration process measurement and network service management program measurement. 
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4.3. Measurement and verification by process init 
After the end of system initialization, process init will create terminal registration process getty for 
users’ log in, authenticate the user name and password through file /etc/passwd, and make an additional 
access authorization control for users through file /etc/usertty. Process init will boot up network services 
management program xinetd. Based on configuration file xinetd.conf, xinetd will decide which network 
port could be listened and which connected services could be booted up for the network port. 
Therefore, we measure the process getty and xinetd indirectly as process init should measure. Firstly, 
we measure process getty through measuring file /etc/passwd and /etc/usertty, and which hash values r3: 
Hash(/etc/passwd|/etc/usertty). Secondly, we measure process xinetd through measuring the integrity of 
service configuration (ISC) and important properties (IPs), and which hash values r4: Hash(ISC|IPs). 
Finally, combine the above two hash values with the operator “|”, and its result will be considered as the 
whole integrity measurement result that process init does. Then the result will be used to do a “^” 
operation with responding value in TPM register, which value will be analyzed for integrity verification. 
_ 9( 3 | 4)getty xinetdT Hash r r PCR= ∧    (9) 
Because we use the method of iterative measuring, the measurement that process init do is based on 
the measurement of measuring process init by kernel, and the files /etc/inittab, /etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit and 
/etc/rc.d/rc that were backed up before should be recovered earlier. 
Basic integrity value measured by process init is as follows: 
PCR-09: 9d f2 76 e4 b8 a4 a0 38 2a 68 d2 91 99 b7 76 50 c7 11 a6 55 
At this time, if files associated with process getty and xinetd were modified, which means its integrity 
attribute was destroyed. And the value will be not consistent with the basic value when we calculate the 
integrity value using the same process and methods. So the process init will not be trusted. 
Routinely, file /etc/passwd and /etc/usertty should be backed up, and then we modify the content of 
related files, recompiling TPM Emulator and extending the value of pcr9, lastly call the system codes to 
read the value of pcr9 as follows: 
PCR-09: 7a a3 d9 24 c6 cc a8 fb 59 a8 4d 5c db 19 c8 95 89 42 8c ca 
It means that if any related file was modified, the integrity measurement value of the file will be not 
consistent with the basic value, then the integrity verification process will not be passed and system 
controlling right will not be transferred to process getty or xinted.  
If the integrity verification passed, it means the process getty and xinted could be trusted in the system 
startup process, then the system controlling right could be transferred, and the user could log in the 
system and work. 
5. Analysis of time performance  
During the Linux trusted startup process, we use the hash function SHA-1 to measure the integrity of 
files, programs and codes, which will add additional time: 
1
( ), ( 1,2,...,9)
n
ii
t t T i=Δ = =∑       (10) 
In the 1GHz Pentium computer, it needs about 13ms when calculate the message digest of the files 
with which size of 1M[7]. The experimental system configuration is as follows: Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo 
CPU T5670 @ 1.8GHz; 1Gb DDR2. Through comparative analysis, the measurement time for file items 
and ranges in the system startup process in CentOS Linux with kernel version 2.6.18 is as table 1. 
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Table1. Time consuming for files measurement 
items（or ranges） time(ms) 
BIOS source code 0.903 
ROMs 0.113 
video cards 0.677 
primary boot blocks(mbr) 0.004 
secondary boot blocks 0.048 
kernel source code 1679 
… … 
Total time 3.4(s) 
Additionally, it needs about 2 seconds in the TPM file I/O operation process. Therefore, from the 
perspective of time performance, it will add about 5.4 seconds if the Linux system implements the 
process of integrity measurement and verification. Take the average total time 56 seconds for the Linux 
startup process, that means it will increase 9% additional time. Linux trusted startup process is 
implemented so as the enhance the system security, while increasing the system’s startup time, but the 
cost of the additional time is in the acceptable range. 
6. Conclusions 
Critical files in the startup process are analyzed based on the Linux startup actual conditions. And 
TPM simulation platform was constructed on the CentOS Linux. Then, the terminal trusted startup 
process is designed and implemented by using the platform’s security properties, based on which to 
ensure the integrity of BIOS, operating system loader and operating system kernel. It is a direction that 
how to read data and codes from memory in the running time through software and hardware methods, 
and do measurement and verification based on the behavior and content dynamically. 
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